Inter-subjectivity

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Latest revision as of 14:57, 26 October 2012

One of the main themes of Phenomenology is the idea of inter-subjectivity, that was originally formulated and conceptualized by the philosopher Edmund Husserl at the beginning of the 20th century. There are a number of different, widespread ideas about the definition of inter-subjectivity.

Different definitions of inter-subjectivity

The thinnest formulation of the definition of 'inter-subjectivity' is "the sharing of subjective states by two or more individuals" (Scheff, 2006). There is inter-subjectivity between people if they agree on a given set of meanings or a definition of the situation.

A more subtle definition of inter-subjectivity refers to the "common-sense": the shared meanings constructed by people in their interactions with each other and used as an everyday resource to interpret the meaning of elements of social and cultural life (Seale, 2004). Basically: if people share common sense, then they share a definition of the situation and there is inter-subjectivity.

Inter-subjectivity and Edmund Husserl

For Husserl inter-subjectivity is more than shared or mutual understanding and is closer to the notion of the possibility of 'being in the place where the Other is' (Duranti, 2010). In the following citation of Husserl (1931) the concept of 'mutual understanding' appears within the context of Husserl's discussion of the unity of consciousness and the human body, which he considers to be a starting point for the establishment of a shared social and cognitive world (Duranti, 2010).

"...it is only through the connecting of consciousness and body into a natural unity that can be empirically intuited that such a thing as mutual understanding between the animal natures that belong to one world is possible, and that only thereby can every subject that knows find before it a full world containing itself and other subjects, and at the same time know it for one and the same world about us belonging in common to itself and all other subjects" (Husserl, 1931).

Inter-subjectivity and Niklas Luhmann

Luhmann turns against the inter-subjectivity of Husserl. He argues that there isn't a direct transmission of information between persons. This transmission of information, or in other words communication, forms an own system in the environment, an autopoiesis (Arnoldi, 2002, p. 6).

Intersubjectivity and Benno Werlen, Anthony Giddens and Jurgen Habermas

Both Giddens and Werlen saw social structures being a result of intersubjectivity, although Jurgen Habermas saw this on the contrary. His theory of communicative action did not replace intersubjectivity but ascribed it mainly to his validity claims of speech acts. This move brings social theory in line with the shift from a philosophy of conciousness to a philosophy of language. For Werlen and Giddens it's not communication that structures meaning and social order, only experiences of interaction do (Zierhofer, 2002).

References

• Duranti, A. (2010). Husserl, intersubjectivity and anthropology. Los Angeles: University of California.
• Husserl, E. (1931). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson). New York: Collier.
• Arnoldi, J. (2002). Niklas Luhman. An Intorduction. In: Theory, Culture & Society. Vol. 18, No. 1, pp 13-18
• Scheff, T. (2006). Goffman Unbound!: A New Paradigm for Social Science (The Sociological Imagination). Paradigm Publishers.
• Seale, C. (2004). Researching Society and Culture. London: Sage.
• Zierhofer, W. (2002) Speech acts and space(s): language pragmatics and the discursive constitution of the social. Environment and Planning A, Vol. 34, pp1355-1372

Contributors

page created by Lars-Olof Haverkort --LarsHaverkort 13:14, 19 September 2012 (CEST)

Edited by Huub van der Zwaluw HuubVanDerZwaluw 17:58, 22 October 2012 (CEST)

Edited by --AnneStrien 10:58, 23 October 2012 (CEST)

--AnneStrien 08:25, 24 October 2012 (CEST)