Courage of truth
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==Courage of Truth== | ==Courage of Truth== | ||
| - | [[File:Courage of Truth - Michel Foucault.jpeg|thumb|The Courage of | + | [[File:Courage of Truth - Michel Foucault.jpeg|thumb|The Courage of Truth is the last course that Michel Foucault delivered at the Collège de France. Here, he continues the theme of the previous year’s lectures in exploring the notion of “truth-telling” in politics to establish a number of ethically irreducible conditions based on courage and conviction. His death, on June 25th, 1984, tempts us to detect the philosophical testament in these lectures, especially in view of the prominence they give to the themes of life and death.]] |
===Truth=== | ===Truth=== | ||
| - | The word truth in the context of Human Geography is very broad interpretable and argued by many various thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. In this text the main focus will be on the person of Foucault. | + | The word 'truth' in the context of Human Geography is very broad interpretable and argued by many various thinkers such as [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], [[Jacques Derrida]] and [[Michel Foucault]]. In this text the main focus will be on the person of Foucault. |
“Contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its own regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). | “Contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its own regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131). | ||
| - | For Foucault truth is either something that is in strong relation with a given | + | For Foucault truth is either something that is in strong relation with a given [[power|Power (according_to_Foucault)]] structure, but which also shifts through various [[episteme]] in history (Foucault, 1970). “’Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime of truth’”(Foucault, 1980, p. 133). |
===Parrhesia=== | ===Parrhesia=== | ||
| - | In order to introduce the courage of truth, the term [[parrhesia]] will first be brought under the attention. Parrhesia, or truth-telling, implies not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the common good, even at personal risk. So parrhesia is the courage of the truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor’s courage in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears (Foucault, 1984). | + | In order to introduce the courage of truth, the term [[parrhesia]] will first be brought under the attention. Described in the first chapter of 'The Courage of Truth'. Parrhesia, or truth-telling, implies not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the common good, even at personal risk. So parrhesia is the courage of the truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor’s courage in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears (Foucault, 1984). |
Parrhesia is not a skill; it is more a mode of action. Parrhesia involves ways of acting, means brought together with a view to an end, and in this respect it has, of course, something to do with technique, but it is also a role which is useful, valuable, and indispensable for the city and for individuals. | Parrhesia is not a skill; it is more a mode of action. Parrhesia involves ways of acting, means brought together with a view to an end, and in this respect it has, of course, something to do with technique, but it is also a role which is useful, valuable, and indispensable for the city and for individuals. | ||
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===Courage of truth=== | ===Courage of truth=== | ||
| - | The lectures of Foucault in 1983 and 1984 are about telling the truth (dire vrai or when referring to parrhesia franc parler) and self-care (gouvernement de soi). In these lectures Foucault speaks especially about telling the truth in the sense of speaking freely, truly and honestly (Greek: parrèsia). Telling the truth for Foucault is in a way a form of speaking, defined as discourse. Discourse, however, not only generally formulated as “knowing” (savoir) based on it’s content, but also towards some kind of behavior or a way of knowing (Karskens, 2011). Foucault himself prefers using the term ‘discourse’ instead of ‘behavior’ (conduite) when the truth or telling the truth is being discussed. And, in addition, Foucault almost never uses the term practice in his readings. | + | The lectures of Foucault in 1983 and 1984 are about telling the truth (dire vrai or when referring to parrhesia franc parler) and self-care (gouvernement de soi). In these lectures Foucault speaks especially about telling the truth in the sense of speaking freely, truly and honestly (Greek: parrèsia). Telling the truth for Foucault is in a way a form of speaking, defined as [[discourse]]. Discourse, however, not only generally formulated as “knowing” (savoir) based on it’s content, but also towards some kind of behavior or a way of knowing (Karskens, 2011). Foucault himself prefers using the term ‘discourse’ instead of ‘behavior’ (conduite) when the truth or telling the truth is being discussed. And, in addition, Foucault almost never uses the term practice in his readings. |
In The Order of Things in 1970, by Foucault, he makes clear that with the rules of ‘truth discourse’ true and false, as opponents (binaries), are leading in what can be said and what should be said. According to Foucault telling the truth is not only a possibility, but also should be an obligation (Karskens, 2011). | In The Order of Things in 1970, by Foucault, he makes clear that with the rules of ‘truth discourse’ true and false, as opponents (binaries), are leading in what can be said and what should be said. According to Foucault telling the truth is not only a possibility, but also should be an obligation (Karskens, 2011). | ||
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===Truth in Geography=== | ===Truth in Geography=== | ||
| - | In the matter of the relationship between truth and power, Foucault highlights his questioning regarding the hierarchies of representational truth. He wants to reveal the discursive rules of the modern Western society. The aim is on to question the nature of truth and falsehood in order to address the relation between truth and power (Matless, 1992). For Foucault truth and power are embedded within each other. This to be understood as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, circulation, and operation of statements", linked in "a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it. A | + | In the matter of the relationship between truth and power, Foucault highlights his questioning regarding the hierarchies of representational truth. He wants to reveal the discursive rules of the modern Western society. The aim is on to question the nature of truth and falsehood in order to address the relation between truth and power (Matless, 1992). For Foucault truth and power are embedded within each other. This to be understood as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, circulation, and operation of statements", linked in "a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it. A [[regime of truth]]" (Foucault, in Matless, 1992, p. 47). Truth is inevitably connected with society and analyzing this society. Foucault argues; "Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society" (Foucault, in Matless, 1992, p. 48). |
| - | The question then rises how does the existing discipline of geography stand in relation to such a philosophy and method? Geertz (in Matless, 1992, p. 48) suggested, in 1983, that: "what we are seeing is not just another redrawing of the cultural map—the moving of a few disputed borders, the marking of some more picturesque mountain lakes—but an alteration of the principles of mapping. Something is happening to the way we think about the way we think". In this phrase Geertz points out a fundamental geographical change. Matless then questions: “What might the role of that geography be in a place and time where "nothing is fundamental"? Matless argues that Foucault’s purpose of restoration is in relation with geography, which is based on most ‘fundamentals’ like nature, landscape, history, and themes of space and place such as nation, heritage, community, home, world. In this concern geography operates at the hearts of the human sciences (Matless, 1992). Matless continues: “Considering such 'fundamentals', in a place and time where we might no longer conceive of them as such, the potential of geography would seem to lie in conducting a genealogy of itself; of the various hearts of geographical knowledge (and I do not here use heart in the sense of 'centre'), and of geographers' own figuring of the world.” | + | The question then rises how does the existing discipline of [[geography]] stand in relation to such a philosophy and method? Geertz (in Matless, 1992, p. 48) suggested, in 1983, that: "what we are seeing is not just another redrawing of the cultural map—the moving of a few disputed borders, the marking of some more picturesque mountain lakes—but an alteration of the principles of mapping. Something is happening to the way we think about the way we think". In this phrase Geertz points out a fundamental geographical change. Matless then questions: “What might the role of that geography be in a place and time where "nothing is fundamental"? Matless argues that Foucault’s purpose of restoration is in relation with geography, which is based on most ‘fundamentals’ like nature, landscape, history, and themes of space and place such as nation, heritage, community, home, world. In this concern geography operates at the hearts of the human sciences (Matless, 1992). Matless continues: “Considering such 'fundamentals', in a place and time where we might no longer conceive of them as such, the potential of geography would seem to lie in conducting a genealogy of itself; of the various hearts of geographical knowledge (and I do not here use heart in the sense of 'centre'), and of geographers' own figuring of the world.” |
====References==== | ====References==== | ||
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====Contributors==== | ====Contributors==== | ||
| - | * Page created by Stan Crienen | + | |
| - | * Page enhanced by Stan Crienen | + | * Page created by Stan Crienen --[[User:StanCrienen|StanCrienen]] 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST) |
| - | * Illustrations added by Stan Crienen | + | |
| + | * Page enhanced by Stan Crienen --[[User:StanCrienen|StanCrienen]] 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST) | ||
| + | |||
| + | * Illustrations added by Stan Crienen --[[User:StanCrienen|StanCrienen]] 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST) | ||
Latest revision as of 14:35, 26 October 2012
Contents |
Courage of Truth
Truth
The word 'truth' in the context of Human Geography is very broad interpretable and argued by many various thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. In this text the main focus will be on the person of Foucault.
“Contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits ... nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: It is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its own regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).
For Foucault truth is either something that is in strong relation with a given Power (according_to_Foucault) structure, but which also shifts through various episteme in history (Foucault, 1970). “’Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime of truth’”(Foucault, 1980, p. 133).
Parrhesia
In order to introduce the courage of truth, the term parrhesia will first be brought under the attention. Described in the first chapter of 'The Courage of Truth'. Parrhesia, or truth-telling, implies not only freedom of speech, but the obligation to speak the truth for the common good, even at personal risk. So parrhesia is the courage of the truth in the person who speaks and who, regardless of everything, takes the risk of telling the whole truth that he thinks, but it is also the interlocutor’s courage in agreeing to accept the hurtful truth that he hears (Foucault, 1984).
Parrhesia is not a skill; it is more a mode of action. Parrhesia involves ways of acting, means brought together with a view to an end, and in this respect it has, of course, something to do with technique, but it is also a role which is useful, valuable, and indispensable for the city and for individuals.
Courage of truth
The lectures of Foucault in 1983 and 1984 are about telling the truth (dire vrai or when referring to parrhesia franc parler) and self-care (gouvernement de soi). In these lectures Foucault speaks especially about telling the truth in the sense of speaking freely, truly and honestly (Greek: parrèsia). Telling the truth for Foucault is in a way a form of speaking, defined as discourse. Discourse, however, not only generally formulated as “knowing” (savoir) based on it’s content, but also towards some kind of behavior or a way of knowing (Karskens, 2011). Foucault himself prefers using the term ‘discourse’ instead of ‘behavior’ (conduite) when the truth or telling the truth is being discussed. And, in addition, Foucault almost never uses the term practice in his readings.
In The Order of Things in 1970, by Foucault, he makes clear that with the rules of ‘truth discourse’ true and false, as opponents (binaries), are leading in what can be said and what should be said. According to Foucault telling the truth is not only a possibility, but also should be an obligation (Karskens, 2011).
When telling the truth, one must reflect his own lifestyle through research and the verification of this research. This is also known as Foucault ‘theory of the aesthetics of existence’, or, in other words, the arts of existence (life as a work of art). This theory implies, in the context of telling the truth, that one should have the courage of truth (Karskens, 2011). Meaning that one should change himself and cross certain boundaries. So not only transformation, but also transgression is of crucial importance in this change.
Truth in Geography
In the matter of the relationship between truth and power, Foucault highlights his questioning regarding the hierarchies of representational truth. He wants to reveal the discursive rules of the modern Western society. The aim is on to question the nature of truth and falsehood in order to address the relation between truth and power (Matless, 1992). For Foucault truth and power are embedded within each other. This to be understood as "a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, circulation, and operation of statements", linked in "a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it. A regime of truth" (Foucault, in Matless, 1992, p. 47). Truth is inevitably connected with society and analyzing this society. Foucault argues; "Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society" (Foucault, in Matless, 1992, p. 48).
The question then rises how does the existing discipline of geography stand in relation to such a philosophy and method? Geertz (in Matless, 1992, p. 48) suggested, in 1983, that: "what we are seeing is not just another redrawing of the cultural map—the moving of a few disputed borders, the marking of some more picturesque mountain lakes—but an alteration of the principles of mapping. Something is happening to the way we think about the way we think". In this phrase Geertz points out a fundamental geographical change. Matless then questions: “What might the role of that geography be in a place and time where "nothing is fundamental"? Matless argues that Foucault’s purpose of restoration is in relation with geography, which is based on most ‘fundamentals’ like nature, landscape, history, and themes of space and place such as nation, heritage, community, home, world. In this concern geography operates at the hearts of the human sciences (Matless, 1992). Matless continues: “Considering such 'fundamentals', in a place and time where we might no longer conceive of them as such, the potential of geography would seem to lie in conducting a genealogy of itself; of the various hearts of geographical knowledge (and I do not here use heart in the sense of 'centre'), and of geographers' own figuring of the world.”
References
- Foucault, M. (1970). The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. New York: Pantheon.
- Foucault, M. (1984) The Courage of Truth. The Government of Self and Others II. Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984, 1-22.
- Karskens M. (2011). Lecture – ‘De moed tot waarheid, Foucault en de vrijheid van meningsuiting’. Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Soeterbeeck Programma. Consulted on 12 Oktober 2011. http://www.ru.nl/soeterbeeckprogramma.
- Matless, D. (1992). An occasion for geography: landscape, representation, and Foucault's corpus. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 1992, 10, 41-66.
Contributors
- Page created by Stan Crienen --StanCrienen 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST)
- Page enhanced by Stan Crienen --StanCrienen 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST)
- Illustrations added by Stan Crienen --StanCrienen 12:45, 24 October 2011 (CEST)
