Free will
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'''Free will opposed to Determinism''' | '''Free will opposed to Determinism''' | ||
| - | According to some scientists, the main challenger of free will is determinism (Gilboa, 2007, p. 1). At first sight, it seems that | + | According to some scientists, the main challenger of free will is [[determinism]] (Gilboa, 2007, p. 1). Determinism is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is, to some large degree, determined by prior states. At first sight, it seems that free will and determinism are opposing each other. This is called incompatibilism (Mele, n.d., p. 1). At the same time some people believe that free will and determinism are compatible. Most contemporary compatibilists that even is determinism is true, people are able to act freely. |
| - | The compatibilists’ beliefs basically come down to this: “when mentally healthy people act intentionally in the absence of compulsion and coercion they act freely, and an action’s being deterministically | + | The compatibilists’ beliefs basically come down to this: “when mentally healthy people act intentionally in the absence of compulsion and coercion they act freely, and an action’s being deterministically caused does not suffice for its being compelled or coerced” (Mele, n.d., p. 3). |
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Mele, A. (n.d.). Free will: action theory meets neuroscience. Found on September 9, 2011, on http://www.unisi.it/eventi/practical_philosophy/paper/Mele.pdf | Mele, A. (n.d.). Free will: action theory meets neuroscience. Found on September 9, 2011, on http://www.unisi.it/eventi/practical_philosophy/paper/Mele.pdf | ||
| - | Published by Tobias Geerdink | + | Published by Tobias Geerdink & Anton de Hoogh |
| + | |||
| + | Enhanced by Marleen Revenberg | ||
Latest revision as of 11:29, 10 October 2012
Free will is a term that describes a sort of capacity for rational agents to choose a course of action from several possible alternatives. Almost all philosophers said something about the meaning of the term free will the last two millennia. The most common description of free will is closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. By this description, acting with free will is to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for undertaken actions. One that undertakes an action is being aware, or not aware, of possible alternatives for that specific action. Nevertheless one that undertakes an action always has to do with the external situation. Especially considering the possible alternatives it is important to realize that these alternatives can be influenced by the external situation. The external situation can increase, or decrease, the possible alternatives from which one can choose in case of a decision making in the situation of free will.
Important question is whether events are determined or not. Philosophers who say events are determined will also conclude that free will (concerning ‘actions-undertaking’) does not exist. In case of indeterminism free will (concerning ‘actions-undertaking’) is a possibility.
Free will opposed to Determinism
According to some scientists, the main challenger of free will is determinism (Gilboa, 2007, p. 1). Determinism is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is, to some large degree, determined by prior states. At first sight, it seems that free will and determinism are opposing each other. This is called incompatibilism (Mele, n.d., p. 1). At the same time some people believe that free will and determinism are compatible. Most contemporary compatibilists that even is determinism is true, people are able to act freely. The compatibilists’ beliefs basically come down to this: “when mentally healthy people act intentionally in the absence of compulsion and coercion they act freely, and an action’s being deterministically caused does not suffice for its being compelled or coerced” (Mele, n.d., p. 3).
References:
O’Conner,T. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosofy, 2005 Consulted: 6 October 2010 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill
Gilboa, I. (2007). Free will: a rational illusion. Found on September 9, 2011, on http://www.tau.ac.il/~igilboa/pdf/Gilboa_Free_Will.pdf
Mele, A. (n.d.). Free will: action theory meets neuroscience. Found on September 9, 2011, on http://www.unisi.it/eventi/practical_philosophy/paper/Mele.pdf
Published by Tobias Geerdink & Anton de Hoogh
Enhanced by Marleen Revenberg
