In-order-to motive
From Geography
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| - | + | This term is used by [[Alfred Schütz]] to point out the different kinds of motives. According to Schütz, we can distinguish a '[[because motive]]' from an in-order-to motive. The latter refers to the capacity of individuals to act as they like, under the basis of certain assumptions (Campbell, 1981). 'Schutz's distinctions here are relevant to contemporary debates about whether freedom is compatible with [[determinism]] since from the perspective of the lived in-order-to motive, one experiences oneself as free and morally responsible' (Barber, 2010). Thus in contrast to the deterministic because motive, the 'in-order-to' motive allows freedom of action and corresponds in this way with indeterminism. Besides refer ‘because motives’ straightforward to past events as cause for action and ‘in-order-to motives’ also fantasize about projected events in the past (Campbell, 1981). Both motives are just randomly chosen by the individual during a certain action, but they are organized in subjective systems of planning. For example the in-order-to motives the individual plans his life, plans for work or the near future et cetera (Schütz, 1960). | |
| - | + | These assumptions need some vision of the best way to reach certain future goals to be accomplished (Campbell, 1981); therefore this ‘in-order-to motive’ concept is a goal-oriented way of acting. To give an example: When you’re going to the lectures of a certain course to prepare yourself for the examination and not because the conditions were beneficial. | |
| - | + | According to Schutz (Werlen, personal communication, 28 September 2010) we only have the in-order-to motives in sight regarding our own actions. The ‘because motives’ give no access to the subjective meaning (it took place in the past). In other words when acting as a free human actor we are consciously trying to achieve a certain goal. For the ‘because motives’ we might say, that they are just valid for [[unconscious actions]]. | |
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| - | According to Schutz (Werlen, personal communication, 28 September 2010) we only have the in-order-to motives in sight regarding our actions. The ‘because motives’ give no access to the subjective meaning (it took place in the past). In other words when acting as a free human actor we are consciously trying to achieve a certain goal. For the ‘because motives’ we might say, that they are valid for [[unconscious actions]]. | + | |
== References == | == References == | ||
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Campbell, T. (1981). ''Seven theories of Human Society''. Oxford: Clarendon Press. | Campbell, T. (1981). ''Seven theories of Human Society''. Oxford: Clarendon Press. | ||
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| + | Schütz, A. (1960). The social world and the theory of social action. ''Social Research''. Vol. 27, No. 2. The New School. | ||
Werlen, B. (2010). Personal communication, 28 September 2010. | Werlen, B. (2010). Personal communication, 28 September 2010. | ||
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Published Lisanne Dols (0822701) & Lorenzo Goudsmits (0827991) | Published Lisanne Dols (0822701) & Lorenzo Goudsmits (0827991) | ||
| - | Edited by Renate van Haaren, | + | Edited by Renate van Haaren,--[[User:RenateVanHaaren|RenateVanHaaren]] 10:57, 9 October 2012 (CEST) |
Latest revision as of 08:57, 9 October 2012
This term is used by Alfred Schütz to point out the different kinds of motives. According to Schütz, we can distinguish a 'because motive' from an in-order-to motive. The latter refers to the capacity of individuals to act as they like, under the basis of certain assumptions (Campbell, 1981). 'Schutz's distinctions here are relevant to contemporary debates about whether freedom is compatible with determinism since from the perspective of the lived in-order-to motive, one experiences oneself as free and morally responsible' (Barber, 2010). Thus in contrast to the deterministic because motive, the 'in-order-to' motive allows freedom of action and corresponds in this way with indeterminism. Besides refer ‘because motives’ straightforward to past events as cause for action and ‘in-order-to motives’ also fantasize about projected events in the past (Campbell, 1981). Both motives are just randomly chosen by the individual during a certain action, but they are organized in subjective systems of planning. For example the in-order-to motives the individual plans his life, plans for work or the near future et cetera (Schütz, 1960).
These assumptions need some vision of the best way to reach certain future goals to be accomplished (Campbell, 1981); therefore this ‘in-order-to motive’ concept is a goal-oriented way of acting. To give an example: When you’re going to the lectures of a certain course to prepare yourself for the examination and not because the conditions were beneficial.
According to Schutz (Werlen, personal communication, 28 September 2010) we only have the in-order-to motives in sight regarding our own actions. The ‘because motives’ give no access to the subjective meaning (it took place in the past). In other words when acting as a free human actor we are consciously trying to achieve a certain goal. For the ‘because motives’ we might say, that they are just valid for unconscious actions.
References
Barber, M. (2010). Alfred Schütz. in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from [1] at 19 Oktober 2010.
Campbell, T. (1981). Seven theories of Human Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Schütz, A. (1960). The social world and the theory of social action. Social Research. Vol. 27, No. 2. The New School.
Werlen, B. (2010). Personal communication, 28 September 2010.
Contributor
Published Lisanne Dols (0822701) & Lorenzo Goudsmits (0827991)
Edited by Renate van Haaren,--RenateVanHaaren 10:57, 9 October 2012 (CEST)
