Cartesian rationalism and Ley & Samuels
From Geography
In 1637, philosopher René Descartes dubbed the statement 'Cogito, ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), introducing a new dimension to the history of Western humanism. The statement means that the mere thinking of someone's own existence is proof that that person exists. It introduced a fundamental doubt about existence itself, and an existential doubt about one's own being, according to Ley & Samuels. This doubt heavily influenced Western science and philosophy, which started to rely on this existential question; as such, this so-called 'Cartesian rationalism' was part of what Ley and Samuels describe as 'scientific humanism', a form of Renaissance humanism in which science is used for getting to know the world, but by doing so making the capacity of the human mind to acquire knowledge about (it's own) existence 'a central problem for philosophical reflection.' (Cloke, P., Philo, Chr. & Sadler, D., 1991).
According to Ley & Samuels, a clear distinction can be made between scientific humanism and the basic tenets of Renaissance humanism, as they see 'proper' humanism and 'conventional' science as opposed to each other. Ley & Samuels thus conclude that the philosophy of Descartes should be regarded as 'dehumanising', as it does not adhere to the 'proper' humanism they envision.
It should be noted that as a critique, some argue that humanism and scientific humanism are unitary and complementary, and also see the philosophies of Descartes not as 'dehumanising' as Ley & Samuels imply, but focus on the distinction Descartes made 'between the 'determined' qualities of matter (the world outside of human beings) and the 'free will' of the mind (the world of human beings)' (Cloke, P., Philo, Chr. & Sadler, D., 1991). They also classify the existential debate Descartes unleashed as being part of the search for 'meaning', which has influenced a lot of humanistic geographers, including Ley & Samuels.
- Cloke, P., Philo, Chr. & Sadler, D. (1991). Approaching Human Geography. Chapman, London.
