Ontology
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== Ontological traditions == | == Ontological traditions == | ||
Bhaskar distinguishes three broad ontological traditions within the philosophy of science: | Bhaskar distinguishes three broad ontological traditions within the philosophy of science: | ||
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| - | + | * Classical empiricism: in which 'the ultimate objects of knowledge are atomistic events'. From this point of view he claims, that 'knowledge and the world may be viewed as surfaces whose points are in isomorphic correspondence': having a direct one-to-one relation with each other. | |
| - | - Transcendental Realism: regards the ultimate objects of knowledge as the 'structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena' and'regards 'such objects exist and act independently of their identification' (Johnston, Gregory, Pratt & Watts, 2000, pp.561-562) | + | * Transcendental Idealism: in which the ultimate objects of knowledge are artificial constructs imposed upon the world. In this perspective knolwedge is seen as a structure rather than a surface' - a structure constituted by the thinking subject. |
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| + | * Transcendental Realism: regards the ultimate objects of knowledge as the 'structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena' and'regards 'such objects exist and act independently of their identification' (Johnston, Gregory, Pratt & Watts, 2000, pp.561-562) | ||
====References==== | ====References==== | ||
Revision as of 08:15, 6 October 2011
Contents |
Contextual understanding
Ontology refers to the theories (or meta-theories) which seek to answer 'the question of what the world must be like for knowledge to be possible'. In this sense, as noted by Bhaskar, every account of science presupposes an ontology (Johnston, Gregory, Pratt & Watts, 2000, pp.561).
Ontological traditions
Bhaskar distinguishes three broad ontological traditions within the philosophy of science:
- Classical empiricism: in which 'the ultimate objects of knowledge are atomistic events'. From this point of view he claims, that 'knowledge and the world may be viewed as surfaces whose points are in isomorphic correspondence': having a direct one-to-one relation with each other.
- Transcendental Idealism: in which the ultimate objects of knowledge are artificial constructs imposed upon the world. In this perspective knolwedge is seen as a structure rather than a surface' - a structure constituted by the thinking subject.
- Transcendental Realism: regards the ultimate objects of knowledge as the 'structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena' and'regards 'such objects exist and act independently of their identification' (Johnston, Gregory, Pratt & Watts, 2000, pp.561-562)
References
- Johnston, R.J., Gregory, Derek, Pratt, Geraldine. & Watts, Michael. (2000). The Dictionary of Human Geography. Blackwell.
Contributors
- page created by Kolar Aparna
