Ideal type (vs. real type)

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Ideal type (vs. real type)

The ideal types is a concept devised by Max Weber in his approach to social society. For Weber, the conduct of social science depends upon the construction of hypothetical concepts in the abstract. The "ideal type" is therefore a subjective element in social theory and research; one of many subjective elements which necessarily distinguish sociology from natural science. Ideal types are simplified models of social activities which are used in interpreting human behavior. The word ideal has no moral or evaluative meaning. An ideal type is not bad or good type of action. Ideal refers to the concept we have in our mind, so in reality it does not exist. Ideal types are extrapolations of selected aspects of action which we then use to understand the actual behavior (the real type of action). This means that some aspects are exaggerated in order to create a meaningful stereotype which can be used to explain behavior (Campbell, 1981, p. 175).

The ideal types are not generalizations themselves, but can be used to classify social phenomena and formulate probable causal connections which can be tested empirically. Ideal types make it possible to see connections between certain beliefs and values and other sociological facts. The ideal type is not a full representation of the action, but a selective oversimplification that enables us to understand the nature of this action (Campbell, 1981, p. 175-176).

In the publication The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber uses the ideal types of ´the protestants´ and of ´the capitalists´ to describe a connection between these two groups. This does not mean Weber pretends to know the features of all protestants and capitalists. Differences between individual members of these groups are reduced to reach a better understanding of this phenomena (Campbell, 1981, p. 176).

We can distinguish four different ideal types of human action (Campbell, 1981, p. 177). These classification is used in Weber's theory of man. We have to realize that these types were distinguished around 1900, and it reflects the context of that time. When we would make a distinction nowadays, it can look pretty different. The four ideal types designed by Weber are:

  • goal rational action, which means that human actors choose a goal, and determine which means they have to use in order to reach that goal as efficient as possible. Weber does not speak about the origin of people´s goals. Goal-rationality is often used in economic situations, like the business world. Another example is a commuter trip; the commuter wants to reach his of her destination as soon as possible, therefore the fastest way is chosen. Thus, efficiency is very important in goal-rational action. This way of acting is constantly about choosing the best means to reach your goal.
  • value-rational action. These actions are no means to reach an end, but are an end and a value in itself. It's about the value that an actor awards to a specific situation, so it's subjective and can differ from person to person. On one hand value-rationality can be moral, a person wants to perform virtues because he or she thinks this is right. On the other hand actions can also be value-rational because it gives a pleasure to the actor. For example a leisure trip; the actor takes a tourist route because the movement in itself is a value.
  • affective actions; these are actions which are undertaken because one 'feels' the emotional urge to act. One can ask himself if this kind of actions are rational or not. How can affective actions be combined with intentionality and consciousness?
  • the last type are traditional actions, these are habituals. They are not prescribed, but people continue to act like they did in the past because it is easier, it feels more familiar, or it is the typical way it is done in this place. It releases people from the burden of constantly making new decisions. We can ask the same question as with the affective actions; how rational are they?

In this concept we can also find the split between the pursuit of understanding and the objectives of causal explanation. The distinction between Understanding and Explaining - Verstehen and Bergrijpen. The ideal types are not objectives of causal explanation themselves, but create an understanding.


References

  • Campbell, T. (1981). Seven Theories of Human Society. Clarendon Press: Oxford.


Contributors

--StefanBehlen 14:13, 24 October 2011 (CEST)

Page edited by RensMennen 15:24, 10 October 2012 (CEST)

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